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Abstract. The report is a working paper which describes and
illustrates different forms of mental representations of the
functional properties of a physical system as found in a
man-machine system context.
The outlines of a morphology of such models are discussed in
terms of different levels of abstraction related to physical
form; physical function; functional structure; abstract func-
tion; and functional meaning or purpose. The distinction between
deterministic quantitative models based on variables and re-
lations, and causal, qualitative models based on objects or
functions which have properties and interact by events, is
discussed. The dependency of the different levels of abstraction
upon representation of aspects of the material basis of the
system versus aspects of human reasons for the existence of the
system is described. Finally, the different strategies of humans
to cope with complexity is briefly discussed in the context of
the morphology.
UDC 007.51 : 62-5 : 65.015.12
RIS0 BIBLIOTEK
5100012943919
November 1979
Riso National Laboratory, DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark
ISBN-87-550-0618-3
ISSN 0418-6435
Rise Repro 1979
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE . . . 5
INTRODUCTION 7
A TAXONOMY OF MODELS 10
MODEL OF PHYSICAL FORM 11
Model of Monolithic Physical Form 11
Model of Structured Physical Form 13
MODEL OF PHYSICAL FUNCTION 15
Behavioural Model, Dynamic State Pattern Model ... 16
Model of Physical Function in Terms of
Objects and Properties 19
Models of Physical Function in Terms of
Variables and Relations 21
MODEL OF FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE 25
Models in Terms of Variables and Relations 25
Models in Terms of "Functions11 and Their
Properties 27
MODELS OF ABSTRACT FUNCTION 29
MODEL OF THE FUNCTIONAL MEANING OR PURPOSE 33
COPING WITH COMPLEXITY 35
Hierarchical Aggregation 40
Abstraction 40
Transfer of Results and Rules 45
CONCLUSION 46
REFERENCES 47

- 5 -
PREFACE
This is an interim report with the aim of supporting an on-going
discussion in a group of system scientists.
The subject area of the group covers analysis of control system
structures for process plant automation; human operator model-
ling and man-machine interface design; and development of
computer codes for systematic industrial risk analysis. The
discussions of the group have frequently focused upon the need
to formalise and harmonize the representations of the functional
properties of physical systems which are the fundamental basis
of the different studies.
In the present report, the morphology of models which appears
from this discussion is described from the point of view of
human operator modelling. The subject is discussed from a more
formal, control theoretic point of view by Lind (1979), and the
causal models applied for risk analysis are described by Taylor
(1979). The hope is ultimately to develop a common and formalis-
ed morphology of models, which will serve an integrated approach
to systems design.
The work is part of the inter-Scandinavian project on control
room design and human reliability, sponsored by the Council of
Nordic Ministers. Report No. NKA/KRU-P2(79)21.
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INTRODUCTION
Many technical or industrial systems in modern times are highly
automated and do not rely on human intervention in the control
of normal, planned functions. Yet their existence depends on
extensive support by a human staff to maintain the necessary
conditions for satisfactory operation and to cope with all the
badly structured and probably unforeseen states of affairs in
the system.
In this role the human is supposed to act as a goal-oriented or
purposive operator, and cybernetic models of humans are there-
fore often discussed. Such models suggest the control of the
activity by feedback corrections from observation of discrepancy
between intended and actual effect. The models are typically
illustrated with reference to physical analogies in terms of
servo-systems and regulators, probably to avoid resemblance to
the miscredited teleological explanations. In their classical
paper (1943) Rosenbluth and Wiener define teleological behaviour
as behaviour which is modified during its course by signals from
the goal. This restrictive definition seems, however, to be due
to an inadequate distinction between the two concepts: causes of
physical events and reasons for physical functions, a dis-
tinction which has been discussed in detail by Polanyi (1958).
Reasons act as the classical "final causes" and can control
functions of behaving systems by selection, be it natural
selection or through human design choices; whereas causes
control physical functions through the causal structure of the
system. Since all technical systems are designed for very
definite reasons, it directly follows that teleological expla-
nations - in the classical sense - of the functions of man-made
systems derived from their ultimate purpose are as important as
causal explanations based on engineering analysis. The same is
the case of explanations of purposive human behaviour.
Actually, even the human position and movement in the physical
environment is only very occasionally directly controlled during
the course of action by simple feedback. It may be the case in
unfamiliar situations calling for accurate and slow time-space
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coordination, but in more complex, rapid sequences, the sensory
equipment is too slow for direct feedback correction, and
adaptation is based on selection and recording of successful
patterns of behaviour for use in subsequent situations, i.e., by
forming an internal dynamic world model. Simple feedback control
of human functions is probably most characteristic for the
internal control of the physiological state of the organisms and
during training of sensori-motor patterns.
Also at the psychological level most human activity depends upon
a rather complex sequence of activities, and feedback correction
during the course of behaviour from mismatch between goal and
final outcome will therefore be too inefficient since in many
cases it would lead to a strategy of blind search. Human
activity in a familiar environment will not be goal controlled,
it will rather be oriented towards the goal and be controlled by
a set of rules which have proven successful previously. In
unfamiliar situations when proven rules are not available,
behaviour may be goal controlled in the sense that different
attempts are made to reach the goal and a successful sequence is
then selected. Typically, however, the attempts to reach the
goal are not performed in reality, but internally as a problem-
solving exercise - i.e., the successful sequence is selected
from experiments with an internal representation or model of the
properties and behaviour of the environment. The efficiency of
humans in coping, with complexity is largely due to the avail-
ability of a large repertoire of different internal models of
the environment from which rules to control behaviour can be
generated ad hoc. An analysis of the form of these internal
mental models is important to the study of human interaction
with complex man-made systems.
The following categories of models are based on an attempt to
characterize and formalise the models found to be of importance
for technicians in diagnostic tasks in the control rooms and the
workshops of industrial plants. The concepts used in the
different models span the range between concepts which are re-
lated to purely physical properties of the system which the man
operates and concepts related only to the purpose of the system,
i.e., the reason for its existence. This is clearly needed in
- 9 -
diagnostic tasks, since physical properties of a system deter-
mine causes of changes and only the purpose of the system is
able to supply references for proper function, or, in Polanyi's
terms, "rules of rightness".
The discussions of human representations of the environment
published so far have often been related to epistomological
problems in natural science (see e.g. reviews by Mihram, 1974)
and have consequently not been considering the purposive aspects
of the environment. The categories covered in such discussions
are not adequate to analyse human knowledge of man-made systems.
The internal representation of the environment used by human
problem solvers has of course been studied by cognitive psy-
chologists (see e.g. Neisser, 1976) .and artificial intelligence
groups (Newell and Simon, 1972; Goldstein and Papert, 1977). In
these cases however, very general representations have been
discussed or emphasis has been laid on analysis of internal
representations in well defined task situations, such as games
or theorem proving which will not uncover the internal represen-
tations used for coping with the complexity of real life tasks
in man-made environments. The effectiveness of humans in such
situations is very probably due to the large repertoire of
different types of representation of the functional properties
of the environment which are at their disposal.
The benefits of •analysing mental processes in terms of ex-
plicitly formulated mental models, strategies and data have been
discussed elsewhere (Rasmussen 1976, 1979). The present
discussion is focused upon functional models, i.e., internal
representations of the structure and functional properties of a
physical environment or system, hence the reference to the
"structure of knowledge". Knowledge of the properties of a sys-
tem can have other forms, such as state pattern models which are
snap-shots of coherent sets of observations, or implicit forms
like procedures which are rules for action upon the physical
world. The relations among functional models, state models,
strategies and procedures are illustrated in fig. 27 and briefly
discussed in the related text.
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A TAXONOMY OF MODELS
The following discussion of the morphology of models is derived
from analysis of protocols recorded during human operators'
interaction with technical systems. A model is here defined as
the internal representation of the properties or constraints in
the environment which determine the interrelations among the
data which can be observed from the environment. In mental
activity, such models are used to predict future events and
responses of the environment to human actions; to find causes
for observed events; to determine proper changes in the environ-
ment to obtain desirable responses etc.
The categories of models stratify the span between the physical
world on the one side, and human purposes, i.e., the reason for
the existence of the physical systems on the other. However, it
seems as if different categories of scientific theories also fit
into this structure. For biological systems this is quite
natural due to evolution by natural selection, since survival
value can be seen as the reason for the observed functional
structure of organisms. That theories of physical sciences fit
into the structure is less obvious,* but may probably be due to
the fact that within physical science functional relations are
studied which are emphasized by contemporary technological
developments. The view that "the character of intellectual
meaning is instrumental" was argued by Dewey (1925), and Smith
(1977) supports the position: "Personally I believe that the
internal structure of science was formed very largely out of the
earlier factual findings of technologists ....". The reason for
discussing the relation between mental models and formal scien-
tific theories in the present context is, however, not philo-
sophical, but the need for formalization of the different
categories of mental models in the design of interactive
man-computer systems. An attempt in this direction has been made
by Lind (1979).
A tentative morphology of mental models has previously been
presented (Rasmussen 1976, 1979); in the following sections the
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structure and content of models related to different categories
between physical realities and human purposes are discussed. The
illustration of these categories is difficult, but attempts are
made by presenting pictorial examples. The reader should,
however, be aware that it is generally the content of the
figures rather than their form which has explanatory value.
MODEL OF PHYSICAL FORM
Model of Monolithic Physical Form
A model of physical form represents the spatial distribution of
matter in the environment; it is a portrait of the physical
landscape. The model is monolithic if it is not structured in
movable objects or parts, but is a recording of the spatial
location of matter, only structured by the modalities of the
sensing systems which are used for its recording: spatial lo-
cation, form and size of fields or territories characterized by
their colour, texture, temperature etc.
This level of modelling of the physical environment is the most
objective, i.e., independent of the intentions of the modeller.
Even then, however, is it dependent upon the intended use of the
environment since this determines the resolution (naked eye,
microscope, etc.) and modality of senses used for recording the
information from the environment. Examples of this kind of model
are static scale models, photographic pictures, eidetic imagery,
etc .
In the human data processor, models of physical form of the
environment serve as reference templates for recognition of
individual faces and places; as subconscious maps for control of
the elementary orientation and movement of the body in familiar
environments. The monolithic model of the surrounding physical
form is the basic spatial structure behind the more complex
models of the environment at higher levels of abstraction or
cognitive consciousness.
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MODEL OF PHYSICAL FORM
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Fig. 1. Microphotography of
integrated electronic cir-
cuit. Only the information
on spatial arrangement of
matter is significant to the
general observer.
Fig. 2. Photography of traditional electronic circuit. To the
uninformed observer this is a portrait of physical form. To ob-
servers with electronic background, this is hardly the case,
as they probably will see a system of functional units - the
picture presents a physical form structured in familiar objects
or components.
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Descriptions of humans in this domain can be illustrated by
portraits and sculptures. Within natural science this is the
level of for instance descriptive geology.
Models of physical form of technical equipment are illustrated
in figs. 1 and 2.
Model of Structured Physical Form
To be useful, models of physical form are generally structured
in generic elements and typical scenery, i.e., in objects and
their spatial relations. Objects are compositions of matter
which are frequently encountered; which can change their lo-
cation without changing their formal characteristics; which are
related to certain human tasks or activities; etc.
The way the physical form is structured into objects depends
upon the intention or insight of the modeller. The environment
can be structured into objects at varying levels of detail and
certain physical aggregates can be free objects or part of the
background depending upon viewpoint and human need.
The model can be generalized to represent typical objects,
rather than the individual physical forms, in a schematized
background or scenery. A highly familiar environment will be
consciously perceived as composed of generic objects. The struc-
turing of the physical form into objects therefore often implies
a simultaneous transition from the individual portrait to the
typical scheme. Examples are topographic and geographic maps as
well as drawings and diagrams identifying physical objects and
their spatial interrelation. See figs. 2 to 5. Models of man at
this level are for instance anatomical maps and models. In the
natural sciences, typical categories are descriptive geography,
and descriptive taxonomies within biology (Linne).
The role of the structured model of physical form is a record of
"where is what"; it links verbal names of things to their
position in space. Structuring the environment in objects and
labelling them according to need and intention is necessary to
- 14
MODELS OF STRUCTURED
PHYSICAL FORM
Fig. 3. Models of structured
physical forms are important cog-
nitive maps referring to where
is what. (This physical form also
carries symbolic information to
those familiar with the purpose
or reason. The form signals in-
ternal state).
Fig. 4. Simultaneously with structuring in components, objects,
the model of physical form typically loses detail and portrait
likeness; it stores a structure of generic elements.
Fig. 5. The purpose
of or reason for a col-
lection of objects can
be so obvious that a
model of physical form
can turn into animated
behavioural model. The
observer adds the
reason and functional
properties implied.
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have an inventory for planning. The structured model of physical
form constitutes a spatial map of tools and objects for action.
Even though the structured and generalized model is used to plan
the activity at the level of choosing means for manual actions,
the monolithic model of the physical form of the environment is
needed as "an individual portrait" for spatial control of the
postural and positional movements of the body. The precision of
this portrait of physical form probably determines the "manual
variability", the degree of "clumsiness" in manual acts.
For human data processors, models of physical form probably have
most significance for control of physical actions; they may also
be needed at the cognitive level when the problem is to judge
the spread of the effects of changes in the physical world,
because the coupling of events basically depends upon the
spatial properties of the environment.
Since the model of physical form represents the spatial, ma-
terial physical world, it represents the physical conditions for
purposeful function of a system - and therefore also the
conditions or causes for missing functions, i.e., faults.
MODEL OF PHYSICAL. FUNCTION
A model of physical function represents the physical structure
of the system and its functional properties in terms of the
objects, e.g. technical components, and their properties with
respect to their mutual interaction.
Physical objects are separated from background by closed, non-
overlapping boundaries. The level of aggregation or decompo-
sition into objects, components, parts can be changed by
rearranging such boundaries according to the need or intention
of the human modeller or actor in the specific situation.
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The functional properties are expressed as the potential for
interaction, i.e., action and re-action among components and
objects. This can be done in several different ways:
Behavioural Model, Dynamic State Pattern Model
The functional properties can be represented by a dynamic map-
ping of the position and shape of the relevant objects of the
environment. The functional properties are then represented by
the correlation in time and space of changes in the environment.
This representation is dependent upon an active model which is
able to simulate the behaviour of the environment; a kind of
analogue spatial-temporal model whose elements are generic
objects with typical patterns of behaviour which can be
synchronized by means of signals from the environment. The
efficient control of the interaction of the human body with the
environment in fast sequences, for instance in ball-games or the
western gun-men's "quick-draw", indicates the presence of such a
model in a human data processor and reveals some important
features:
- Feed-forward control of skilled patterns of movements.
- Simulation of the behaviour of the body and the environment in
real time..
- Alignment and synchronization by selected, subconscious fea-
tures of sense data.
- High precision, hence quantitative, analogue representation of
variables.
- The simulation is performed in an active, distributed, i.e.,
parallel processing model.
The model controls the behavioural pattern below the level of
conscious intention and it acts as reference in mismatch detec-
tion and attention control.
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Causality plays no role in the model, except in the Humean sense
of time-space correlations.
At the conscious level, this kind of model can be applied in
case of "dynamic imagery", i.e., the behaviour of the environ-
ment is visualized, "foreseen". In this case, the state of the
model can be initialized by verbal statements and activated by
such, and thus the relation to the models behind natural
language representations may be very close.
An important function of the subconscious world model is its
control of the sensory equipment, which is continuously directed
towards the focus dictated by expectations or experience, i.e.,
towards aspects which are known to be variable or uncertain or
which have caused a mismatch. This kind of internal dynamic
world model is necessary to explain why human observers also
will notice omissions in the behaviour of the environment. Ob-
served events may be absence of familiar occurrences.
Examples of this kind of model are difficult to illustrate.
Basically, such models are active, dynamic material analogies
for simulation. The internal dynamic world model of man can be
realized by a pulse-density coded, distributed parallel process-
ing logical network. Such networks have been suggested for high
capacity analogue computers (Ribeiro 1967).
Structural analogue models can be represented by sequential
process models in digital computers of sufficient speed and
capacity. The important feature of analogue models in the
present context is, however, their homomorphic representation of
the environment. There is a one to one mapping of structures and
processes. This feature is necessary to allow immediate and
simple updating of the model in response to changes in the
environment.
The data processes in simulation by means of an analogue model
are determined by the structure and elements of the model and
are controlled by general physical laws when the model has been
initialized and activated. No sequential control algorithm is
needed. Accordingly, this kind of data processing must be either
- 18 -
MODEL OF PHYSICAL
FUNCTION
Components/states/
events
INPUT
C6 C7 13.5 V
OUTPUT
C13
Fig. 6. Schematic representation of the functional
structure of fig. 2. Schematic diagrams interrelate
symbols for components which, to the professional ob-
server, have well-known functional properties.
Fig. 7. Compare with fig. 4.
Fig. 8. Functional structure
of circuit of fig. 1.
Together with well-known
component properties it
forms a model of physical
function.
Fig. 9. Schematic diagram
of fossile power plant. When
used,"component properties
are expressed qualitatively:
pumps circulate water, they
can stall etc., transistors
amplify; diodes clamp volt-
ages etc., valves open and
shut and fail to open etc.
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simulated or represented by mathematical time functions. Several
such mathematical models of selected functions of the sub-
conscious dynamic world model have been developed:
Young (1969) describes manual control of vehicles, Curry (1976)
and Sheridan (1976) model man's attention in monitoring task
using optimal Kalman filters to represent the internal world
model, Senders (1976) models the control of information selec-
tion by means of sampling and queueing theory.
This behavioural model has a special status in the taxonomy of
models which is also evident from the part it plays in the
context of fig. 27. First of all, it is an active model, it
includes a processor and basically it should be classified as an
animated model of physical form; it represents the form and
time-space processes. (Also a model of physical form has a spe-
cial status, since it represents the form at a specific time, it
is a snap-shot and therefore also can be classed as a state
pattern model). It is, however, convenient to maintain the "be-
havioural model" as a separate category to distinguish between
high capacity, subconscious processes and the low capacity se-
quential processes based on conscious use of static models.
Model of Physical Function in Terms of Objects and Properties
Models of physical function used for conscious, sequential
reasoning can be divided into two main categories: Models ex-
pressed in terms of physical objects with specific functional
properties representing their potential for interaction, and
models expressed in terms of variables and their functional re-
lations . In the latter case, the state and behaviour of a system
are represented by magnitudes of measurable variables, and their
interrelation is represented by a set of rules specifying their
interdependence. When models based on objects and properties
are used, the state and behaviour of the system are represented
by collective, qualitative variables in terms of states, events
and actions. This leads to inaccurate representation of the
magnitude of the individual physical variables, but at the same
time to a precise representation of total, complex situations.
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This is the case when the person is familiar with and aware of
the context, i.e., his internal "behavioural" world model is
properly updated and synchronized. The internal model can then
support the interpretation of fuzzy, verbal state represen-
tations.
Examples illustrating models in terms of objects, properties,
and events can be found in the semantic nets used to represent
natural language reasoning in artificial intelligence programs
(See e.g. Charniak and Wiks, 1976; see also Rieger and Grinberg,
1976).
In other words, to be effective in control of human interaction
with a physical environment, the mental model in terms of ob-
jects, events and actions clearly depends upon the interpretive
function of perception and the translating function of sensori-
motor pattern of actions.
This type of model of physical function is based on stored rules
and learned associations. The levels of object and event
formation and formulation of intention for actions depend upon
the level of skill. In case of difficulty, of lack of appropri-
ate rules, the trick is generally to move to a more detailed
level of objects which will then typically be more familiar, and
to deduce the necessary rules at this level.
The cooperation of the subconscious, behavioural world model and
a mental model of physical function in terms of objects and
events is a characteristic of concrete reasoning in natural
language. However, the same mode of data processing can be
effective in abstract reasoning when the concepts are represent-
ed by verbal or graphic symbols. These symbols can then be
manipulated like artificial objects which have properties and
interact through events. The elements or concepts of a verbal
representation can then be symbols for symbols or even higher
order symbols, and their interpretation depends heavily upon the
context defined by the internal world model.
The concepts of general languages such as natural languages or
general purpose computer languages are much more complex than
- 21 -
the concepts needed for modelling the environment will be, if
the level of abstraction can be explicitly defined and controll-
ed. The difficulty in definition of the elements of natural
language representations clearly appears in development of
formal descriptions such as e.g. conceptual graphs (see Sowa
1976).
Models of a physical system in terms of objects and properties,
states and events represent the functional possibilities. The
purpose of or reason for the system is only represented by the
actual selection of the present set of objects. The model can
therefore be used for description of the possible functions -
normal or abnormal - of a given system. The purpose of the
system does not constrain the language used to describe it at
this level, and changes in the system or its use are easily
reflected by changes in the model.
Examples of models at this level are schematic diagrams inter-
relating components which have familiar properties, see figs. 6
to 9; and semantic nets, see fig. 10. Natural language reasoning
is found in cause-consequence charts, see fig. 11. In natural
sciences, this is the level of description in e.g. Aristotelean
physics, but also in modern science it is used to describe
tools, circumstances and background for the selective descrip-
tions at more theoretical or formal levels.
Models of Physical Function in Terms of Variables and Relations
When quantitative representation of the state of the environment
is necessary, the state must be represented by a set of
measurable variables. The functional properties of the system
are then represented by sets of rules or relations interconnect-
ing the variables. In this way, the physical components are dis-
solved into nets of relations between variables, and these vari-
ables are the "objects" of the data processing. The model is
therefore in a way complementary to the models based on objects
and properties; events and actions.
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MODELS OF PHYSICAL
FUNCTION
Objects/states/
events
PROXIMITY(wall)
John <£*- PTRANS ^ - t a b l e
1
table
Loan.
y * U PROXIMITY(wall)
LOC(X) r
Fig, 10, Semantic net representation of
elements of natural language discourse
- objects, events, states. "John pushed
the table to the wall". Shank (1975).
•Swtichovf'otorm)
ZLIMISS
**» '
•if^
Omostot switch
" Thost numbors rtfvr to faMurt mod*
numbers in Tobto 01 of appendix 0.
Fig. 11. A cause and
effect diagram rep-
resents interrelation
of potential events in
a system. This is a
stored set of if-then
arguments derived from
a functional model in
terms of objects, prop-
erties and states,
events. This is advan-
tageous due to the close
relation to physical
events (faults). Nielsen
1977.
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At the level of physical function, the variables and relations
refer to properties of objects and parts with reference to the
boundaries which delimit components and at which the variables
are chosen. The variables will generally be incoherent sets of
members of different physical categories, such as temperatures,
pressures, positions, voltages, etc., and the relations may be
expressed by calculating rules, mathematical formulas or by
graphic means as (fields of) characteristics which are theor-
etically or empirically obtained, but which characterize a
typical component.
This kind of representation is necessary during design to
coordinate the interaction among components. The limiting prop-
erties of components and systems must be quantitatively express-
ed, and the corresponding variables must be controlled during
plant operation with reference to such quantitative values.
Measurement and display of individual quantitative variables is
therefore important for adjustment of operation of a system to
the proper, intended mode of operation.
However, presentation of the individual quantitative magnitudes
of variables is closely related to a data processing model
structured in variables and a net of relations. This represen-
tation is very difficult to use by operators in unsupported
functional reasoning, since natural language causal reasoning
will be based on objects, states and events. Unless measured
variables are transformed into symbols which can be directly
perceived in this language, an operator will typically use
characteristic variables individually as signs for internal
states of the system, i.e., each variable becomes a represen-
tation of a large set of variables.
Models of this category are illustrated by the examples in figs.
12 to 14. Variables/relations models are normally only used to
solve isolated problems of very limited size, unless artificial
tools (calculators; paper and pencil) are available to handle
the numeric processing rules. At this level of models of
physical function, relations are tied to individual or typical
components, and they can be found empirically or derived from
general rules at a higher formal level. They can be represented
MODELS OF PHYSICAL FUNCTION
Variables/nets of relations
- 24 -
Spring
K
7777777/77777 7777777777777
Viscous damping, D
K - spring constant U - inertia
Fig. 13. Functional model
of a measuring bridge.
Variables are represented
analogically and relations
by geometric conventions
to support visual process-
ing.
"be
/-D it
0
D m damping < cx»(ficient
Fig. 12. Variables and
relations describe inter-
action of mechanical com-
ponents. Note: the system
is defined by pictorial
representation. The gen-
eral theoretical laws of
this level serve as calcu-
lating rules.
"tfe ht\ <et> I££ "ce
Typical behaviour of collector current versus collector-emitter voltage
VCE(V) A
Typical behaviour of collector current
versus collector-emitter voltage
(mA)
- 2 5 ° C -
620 mV
•610mV;
5 V C E (V) TO 400 600 800 \feg<mV) 1000
Fig. 14. Functional model
of transistor amplifier
stage. Relations are rep-
resented by field of charac-
teristics, and visual ma-
nipulations are convenient.
"Equivalent" diagrams fa-
cilitate natural language
manipulation of internal
transistor properties.
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by calculating rules (Ptolemaean epicycles; Ohm's law etc.); by
tables; or by graphic means. In unsupported reasoning, the
quantitative variables will generally be discretized ("high",
"low") or represented in relation to a reference ("a little
higher than normal").
MODEL OF FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE
Models in Terms of Variables and Relations
At this level of modelling the full consequence is taken of the
disintegration of objects into nets of relations among vari-
ables, and the main element of the model structure is the "func-
tion" , i.e. a set of relations among variables across boundaries
of physical parts which is frequently met and generally useful
irrespective of its physical basis. In a way such functions rep-
resent standardized, generic elements of system purposes. A mod-
el at this level is applicable for different kinds of physical
systems, the use can be generalized and therefore models at this
level of abstraction can support transfer of knowledge and ex-
perience between quite different systems. Examples of functions
are "feedback loops", "cooling circuit", "p.i.d. control func-
tion" etc. The relations among variables can be expressed by
calculating rules or graphically, as was the case for the quan-
titative model of physical function. The model of the functional
structure is tied with system properties rather than component
structures. Although generalized, this level of modelling still
relates to variables which represent physical, i.e., mechanical,
chemical, electrical properties of the system. The structure of
the model does not necessarily reflect the physical structure of
the system, but selected elements of its behavioural structure.
This level is typically the level of scientific modelling and
technical analysis. The rules or laws used to interrelate
variables are general, system-independent laws, but they are ex-
pressed in concepts related to the physical system in question,
e.g. the laws of Newton, Bernoulli and Ohm.
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MODELS OF FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE
Fig. 15, Generalized
net of relations
describing a tran-
sistor. Must be used
together with the
signal flow-graph
conventions.
Vis) O— V(.v)
Fig. 16. Examples of generalized
description of feed-back systems.
Must be used together with control
theoretic conventions.
Control
v»lvt D
-Q=-s DtstiUate
r4« + l
Measuring
Fig. 17. Feed-back system properties rep-
resented by "time constants", a generalized
representation of behaviour in time domain
or frequency domain.
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The boundary between quantitative models of physical function
and those of functional structure is not too well defined. The
distinction is mainly that the relations used in the first cat-
egory are related to or embodied in physical components, whereas
the relations in the latter category are totally independent of
boundaries among components. Very often the "functions" at this
level are overlapping aggregations of sets of relations from the
lower level, being related to elementary purposes rather than
physical elements. Examples are shown in figs. 15 to 17.
Models of man in this domain can for instance be quantitative
physiological theories of metabolic functions and electro-chemi-
cal functions of nerve tissue. In psychology, some quantitative
models of experimental psychology may be referred to this cat-
egory of models.
Models in Terms of "Functions" and Their Properties
The efficiency of natural language descriptions based on collec-
tive variables in terms of states and events related to objects
can be transferred to models of functional structures, if "func-
tions" are considered "artificial objects" or symbols which are
ascribed properties and potential for interaction and which re-
spond to events and actions: Feedback loops can be stable, os-
cillating, respond to disturbances by overshoot etc.; cold
slugs in boilers "lap up" steam; decrease of cooling result in
"boil-out".
The efficiency of this type of model is due to representation of
the functional properties of a system in terms of typical or
"standardized" functional elements which are independent of
their physical or material basis and of the specific system.
Therefore, this representation supports transfer of knowledge of
rules and empirical experience.
The functional structure of the total system can then be de-
scribed by the interaction of typical "standard" functions which
can often more easily be identified by an analysis or a
decomposition of the overall purpose of the system in the light
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MODELS OF FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE
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Fig, 18, Block diagram representing functional structure which
does not necessarily represent physical structure.
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Fig, 19. This block diagram represents the circuit of fig. 8,
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of the applied technology and design practice than they can be
synthesized from their physical elements. This category of
representations can be illustrated by "schematic block
diagrams", figs. 18 and 19, which describe the functional
structure of a system by means of functional elements, the
properties of which are supposed to be familiar to a pro-
fessional reader. In this category the typical verbal presen-
tation of natural science theories is found together with most
theories of traditional psychology.
MODELS OF ABSTRACT FUNCTION
The models of system structure and function discussed so far
have the form of a structure of interactions among a number of
typical components or functions. The system models are obtained
by analysis which breaks the total system down into parts -
physically or functionally - to a level where their behaviour
and responses to changes are known or can be derived by familiar
rules and relations.
To represent the overall function of the system by a consistent
model, it is necessary to move up in abstraction level to a lan-
guage which is independent of the local physical and functional
properties; i.e., which depends on universal laws and symbols.
The overall function of a system must be represented by a gen-
eralized causal network, e.g. in terms of energy, matter and
information flow structures. We are in the domain of Boolean
algebra; the cybernetic laws of systems theory; and the laws of
conservation of matter and energy. The laws and symbols form a
consistent structure .which is axiomatically true and therefore
"device- and process-independent". Cassirer (1921) in his dis-
cussion of substance versus function characterizes the concept
of energy as follows: "Energy is able to institute an order
among the totality of phenomena, because it itself is on the
same plane with no of them; because lacking concrete existence,
energy only expresses a pure relation of mutual dependency".
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MODEL OF ABSTRACT FUNCTION
Fig. 20. Abstract function of the
circuit figs. 8 and 19. This func-
tion cannot be derived from physi-
cal analysis, but is derived from
purposes and reasons by means of
conventions, e.g. high voltage
level = logic 1, low voltage level
= logic 0.
mass flow path
energy flow path
Fig. 21. Energy and mass flow model of fossile power plant, see
fig. - shows the flows determined by intended proper function.
For details, see Lind (1979).
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The model at this level of overall system function can only be
formed by considering a properly functioning system, since the
parameters of its global function depend upon the proper
functional state of all parts and upon the couplings to the
environment, e.g., input signals, supply of energy, etc. This
implies knowledge of the reasons behind system structure, since
the reasons and purpose define proper function. Compare the role
of the "principle of least work" in Hamiltonean theories.
The consideration of reason also influences the modelling pro-
cess at lower levels of abstraction, but more implicitly. Since
the elements of the models at these levels are familiar, gener-
ally used objects and functions, their existence as standardized
elements per se reflects purpose and reason.
The transition from the domain of functional structure to that
of abstract function is probably most evident when considering
information processing systems. Here, the overall function of
the system must clearly be described independently of the local
physical functions of its elements, since the information con-
tent of physical variables and states depends purely upon a set
of translation conventions.
Use of a model at the level of abstract function clearly de-
pends on the definition of such a set of conventions to relate
variables of a system to those of the model.
A model in terms of flow of energy, matter and information is a
symbolic model, and its symbols are probably especially well
suited for human data processing, since flows in a topographic
map are well suited for imagery and visual processing. The
distinction between natural language processing and the use of
variables/relations is not very clear at this domain; a feature
which defines phenomenological descriptions in general? The
relation of this level of model to thermodynamic theories should
be considered. Cassirer (1923) notes: "Whether we conceive
energy as a substance, or as the expression of a causal re-
lation, depends finally on our general idea of the nature of the
scientific construction of concepts in general".
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MODELS OF FUNCTIONAL MEANING
Flow
Pressure
Logic is *-iven for the 1 state
Figs. 22 and 23. Functional structure of a system represented
by the functional effects upon the environment, i.e., abstract
functional model in terms of events and states. Diagrams are
from Wheeler (1975).
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In the domain of natural sciences, this level includes theories
derived from general principles which act as a kind of reason
from which system properties can be deduced: First and second
law of thermodynamics; "survival value" of Darwin's theory;
"least work" of Hamilton's theory, etc. Psychological models in
this domain are typically those of recent cognitive psychology
which are based on formal information processing concepts and
cybernetic principles. Technical examples are illustrated in
figs. 20 and 21.
In data processing related to interaction with a physical world,
this level of model can generally be used to structure the total
system function - for the properly working system. This model
therefore supplies references in general terms to judge perform-
ance of a system.
MODEL OF THE FUNCTIONAL MEANING OR PURPOSE
The definition of the system model was stated as a represen-
tation of the constraints upon the relationship among the vari-
ables which can be observed from a system. In the models dis-
cussed so far, the constraints have been related to the struc-
ture and properties of the system, even though the modelling to
a large extent is controlled by consideration of the "purpose"
of the system. It is, however, also possible to relate the
constraints directly to the environment, i.e., to express the
system model in terms referring to functional properties of the
environment. This is, e.g., the case when the function of a
control system is represented in terms of its effect upon the
function of a connected process plant or when the function of a
computer is represented by a decision table or a decision flow
chart in terms of problem variables.
The model of functional meaning specifies the properties of a
system in terms of relations between variables or states and
events in the system's environment. Other specifications ex-
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press desired states or magnitudes of variables directly or to
values of states and variables. Such specifications are state
models rather than functional models.
The concept of functional meaning has very close relation to the
definition of system boundaries. "Functional meaning" is a
concept representing the function of one part of the environment
in terms of the rest of the environment, i.e., it implies a
boundary around the "system", which will change with the at-
tention of the observer. The "system" is that part of the en-
vironment which the observer wants to control or influence, the
part between the potential actions or inputs and the observed
output.
Figs. 22 and 23 give examples of models in terms of the func-
tional meaning of industrial control systems.
The functional properties of systems with autonomous internal
organization originating from adaptive or learning capabilities
cannot be represented by straightforward information on the
internal anatomy or function. In this case it is generally pref-
erable to use models in the domain of functional meaning. This
is particularly true when models of man's decision making is
needed. Such "intentional models" (Dennett 1971) can be used to
predict system response from knowledge of the input information,
and the actual intention (or purpose) of the system (or the
designer), since it can be assumed that the system behaves
rationally as long as the actual performance does not surpass
the capability limits of the system. This kind of model is not
only used when dealing with self-organizing goal-oriented sys-
tems, but can also be used effectively to recollect degenerated
functional models of less complex systems. These models are then
obtained by "redesign" of the system based on assumption of the
design intentions or purpose combined with general professional
knowledge of the applied technology or internal functional
elements.
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COPING WITH COMPLEXITY
In the verbal protocols we have evidence that the ability of man
to cope with the complexity of industrial environments, is due
to his ability to shift his internal representation or mental
model freely and effectively to match the immediate task
demands.
In the analysis of the behaviour of people working on technical
systems, our modelling of his mental processes is performed in
terms of information processing concepts. To avoid confusion
with man's own mental models of his work environment, our models
of his mental mechanisms will be termed descriptions in the
following sections. This description will only deal with his
cognitive functions. The psychological basis for these functions
as well as the influence of affective functions and personal
preferences and values are, of course, of importance. However,
it will be a great advantage if the cognitive and affective
functions can be described separately. Possibly then, concepts
such as performance criteria, subjective goals, and "performance
shaping factors" can be used to relate the concepts of data
processing, used for functional descriptions, with the concepts
of human values, used in descriptions of emotional states, see
fig. 24.
The output of a human data processor in interaction with a
physical system always consists of actions, i.e., changes of the
spatial arrangements of things, i.e., the body and external
objects. Actions have extensions in time, and decompositions of
a current activity into a sequence of actions can be done in
many ways. In the present discussion, we can define an action to
be part of performance which follows as one integrated, smooth
piece of behaviour, the conscious forming of an intention - to
turn a switch, to make tea, to start a car. The size and
complexity of actions then very reasonably depend on the skill
of the individual man. This means that actions are the pieces of
behaviour which are performed under control of the internal,
dynamic world model without conscious control decisions.
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This is the first trick for coping with complexity: Temporal
integration of the interaction of body and environment into
behavioural units serving familiar intentions with transfer of
control to the high capacity subconscious system; at level 1,
fig. 25.
To cope with less familiar situations, a sequence of such ac-
tions must be controlled by a conscious linking together of a
sequence of proper intentions which then can activate the
related actions. In the following discussion, a sequence of
intentions and actions designed to bring the environment into a
specified state is called a procedure. Such a procedure gener-
ally contains a sequence of statements of system states separ-
ated by specification of actions which will bring the system
into the next state. A procedure implicitly contains elements of
a model of the physical function of the system in that it
specifies the relation between events induced by human actions
and the consequent state of the system, which is then related to
the next action of the procedure. However, it is a very rudi-
mentary model, linked to a restricted flow of events which are
valid under special conditions and purposes.
The procedure used in a specific man-machine interaction can be
based on a stored set of rules which are empirically collected
during previous occasions and thereafter selected and stored as
successful sequences; or they can be generated by some other
person and prescribed in the form of work instructions. In both
cases, we are in the domain of stereotyped, rule-controlled
performance, level 2 of fig. 25. See also fig. 27 on page 44.
In new situations when appropriate procedures have not yet
evolved or cannot be composed of familiar subsequences, the task
must be accomplished by goal-controlled performance, i.e., the
proper sequence must be selected from trial and error or based
on causal functional mental operations.
Mental operations in this domain are depending on the func-
tional models of the environment described in the previous
section. Further, the mental processes must be controlled by a
complex set of process rules which can be described in terms of
a hierarchy of strategies. Like the different categories of
- 38 -
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Fig. 25. Schematic illustration of different categories of
human data processing.
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models, different categories of rules and strategies can be
formulated; categories which are specifically tied to different
types of environments, tasks, goals or subjective performance
criteria. The efficiency of humans in coping with the complexity
of the physical world is due to an ability to apply knowledge
from previous experience to new situations by selecting and
freely combining models, rules and strategies whic_h have proven
successful separately in other situations. In the present
context, only the role of the different categories of functional
models will be discussed in some detail.
Several problems meet the human data processor in the interac-
tion with a complex physical environment. Only a few elements of
a problem can be within the span of conscious attention simul-
taneously. This means that the complex net of causal relations
of the environment must be treated in a chain of mental oper-
ations, often leading to effects like the law of least resist-
ance and the point of no return. That is, strategies which de-
pend on sequences of simple operations are intuitively pre-
ferred, and there will be little tendency to pause in a line of
reasoning to backtrack and develop alternative or parallel paths
(Rasmussen 1974).
An effective way to counteract limitations with processor ca-
pacity and short term memory seems to be to modify the basis of
mental data processing - the mental model - to fit it to the
specific task in a way which optimizes the transfer of previous
results and minimizes the need for new information. The ef-
ficiency of human cognitive processes seems to depend upon an
extensive use of model transformations together with a simul-
taneous updating of the mental models in all categories with new
input information, an updating which is performed below the
level of conscious attention and control.
Several strategies for model transformation are possible and are
generally used to facilitate mental data processing, such as:
- Aggregation; elements of a representation are aggregated into
larger units, chunks, within the same model category as fam-
iliarity with the context increases.
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Abstraction; the representation of the properties of a system
or the environment in general is transferred to a model cat-
egory at a higher level of abstraction.
Use of ready-made solutions; the representation is transferred
to a category of model for which a solution is already known
or rules are available to generate the solution.
Hierarchical Aggregation
For this strategy, elements of a model are aggregated into larg-
er units at the same level of abstraction. At the level of
physical function for instance, objects are lumped into larger
physical objects and thus a hierarchical structure of parts and
wholes is formed. Typically, a number of frequently found ob-
jects are united into more specialized objects. In man-made
systems, identification of objects or components is structured
according to their purpose, and it is, therefore, the purpose of
a physical system which has a hierarchical nature rather than
the system itself. This illustrates the point that models at
each level of abstraction depend both upon the physical re-
alities as well as upon the purpose or the functional meaning of
the system. Thus the physical world supplies potentialities, in
the form of possible functions while purpose or functional
meaning selects the actualities, the realized functions.
This kind of hierarchical decomposition of the purpose or func-
tional meaning can be performed within each of the categories of
models.
Abstraction
The different levels of abstraction formed by the categories of
functional models discussed in the present report are created by
selecting potential functional properties of the physical world
and then expressing them in purposive structure at different
levels of abstraction- At the lowest level of abstraction, the
model and its elements are tied to a specific physical system or
- 41 -
type of system, but can represent the properties of the system
under varying functional conditions or for different purposes.
The model can be conveniently modified according to changes in
the physical world, for instance to take into account the
effects of spontaneous changes in the material structure,
"faults".
On the other hand, at high levels of abstraction, the models are
more closely related to a specific actual purpose, to the
intended functional properties and to a large extent they are
independent of the physical world underlying the function.
In other words, models at low levels of abstraction are related
to a specific physical world which can serve several purposes.
Models at higher levels of abstraction are closely related to a
specific purpose which can be met by several physical arrange-
ments. Therefore shifts in the level of abstraction can change
the direction of potential paths for transfer of knowledge from
previous cases and problems. At the two extreme levels of mod-
els, the directions of the paths available are in a way ortho-
gonals, since transfer at one level follows physical, material
properties, at the other it follows purpose.
Important human functions in man-machine systems are related to
correction of the effects of errors and faults. Events can only
be defined as errors or faults with reference to intended state,
normal function or other variants of system purpose or func-
tional meaning. The functional models at the different levels
of abstraction play different roles in coping with error struck
systems. Causes of improper functions are depending upon changes
in the physical or material world, they are explained "bottom-
-up" in the levels of abstraction, whereas reasons for proper
function are derived "top-down" from the functional meaning, see
fig. 26.
The clear distinction between causes of faults and reasons for
function has been discussed in detail by Polanyi (1958): "There
is a specific reason for every step of a procedure and every
part of the machine, as well as for the way the several steps
and various parts are linked together to serve their joint pur-
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pose", "Since rules of Tightness cannot account for fail-
ures, and reasons for doing something can only be given within
the context of rules of Tightness, it follows that there can be
no reasons (in this sense) for a failure. It is best therefore,
to avoid the use of the word "reason" in this context and to
describe the origins of failures invariably as their causes".
Another human task for which the use of representations at sev-
eral levels of abstraction is of obvious value is the design
of technical systems. Basically, system design is a process of
iteration between considerations at the various levels rather
than an orderly transformation from a description of purpose to
a description of the concept in terms of physical form. There
exists a many to many mapping between the two levels, a purpose
can be served by many physical configurations and a physical
system can serve many purposes or have a variety of effects.
The use of different categories of model in a design strategy
has been explicitly discussed by Alexander (1964, p. 89): "Every
form can be described in two ways: from the point of view of
what it is, and from the point of view of what it does. What it
is is sometimes called the formal description. What it does,
when put in contact with other things, is sometimes called the
functional description". Alexander continues (p. 90): "The
solution of a design problem is really only another effort to
find a unified description. The search for realization through
constructive diagrams is an effort to understand the required
form so fully that there is no longer a rift between its
functional specification and the shape it takes".
If we accept the complex of strata between physical form and
functional meaning of technical systems, an "invention" is re-
lated to a jump of insight which happens when one mental struc-
ture upward from physical form and another downward from func-
tional meaning, which have previously been totally unconnected,
suddenly merge to "a unified description".
The number and characteristics of the categories of functional
models discussed in the previous section have been derived from
considerations connected with electronic data processing systems
- 44 -
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for which all of the levels are found to be of importance for
human reasoning. This is not necessarily the case for other
types of systems since the functional meaning may be directly
related to the lower levels of abstraction, consider for in-
stance transportation and manufacturing systems. Only for infor-
mation systems, where flows of energy and matter have no direct
relevance for the ultimate purpose but are purely means to ob-
tain a causal connection between events or variables which are
otherwise unrelated, is the functional purpose directly related
to the level of abstract function.
Transfer of Results and Rules
Each level of abstraction or category of model depends upon a
special model language, i.e., a set of symbols and syntactic
rules. Shifting the level of modelling can be very effective in
a problem situation since data processing at another level can
be more convenient, the process rules can be simpler or better
known or results can be available from previous cases. A special
instance of this strategy is the solution of a problem by simple
analogy which depends upon the condition that different physical
systems have the same representation at higher levels of
abstraction.
In some cases, efficient strategies can be found where symbols
are transferred to another level of abstraction and reinter-
preted. A simple example will be the subconscious manipulation
of symbols which are reinterpreted as artificial objects, e.g.,
Smith's (1976) solution of scheduling problems by manipulation
of rectangles; or the reinterpretation of numbers in terms of
actions for calculations by means of an abacus.
This recursive use of the categories of functional models adds
another dimension to the variety of tricks to cope with com-
plexity. The most general and effective is, of course, the use
of natural language to represent the models verbally at all
levels of abstraction. However, this generality is offset by the
difficulty of keeping track of the context, i.e., the category
of model behind the symbols.
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CONCLUSION
As the preface has indicated, the scope of the present report
has been to discuss a taxonomy of models in task independent
terms.
In the present form the discussion of different types of models
appears somewhat pedantic, because their complex interaction in
real human data processing cannot be described unless the large
repertoire of strategies which are used is also treated. The
strategies and the frequent jumps between strategies in particu-
lar depend very much upon the actual task and the specific work
situation and cannot be discussed in general terms. The interac-
tion between strategies and models has been discussed in some
detail for a diagnostic task elsewhere (Rasmussen, 1978) and
will be the subject for further study.
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